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SECURITIES LAW-SECOND CIRCUIT CHANGES
TIPPING JURISPRUDENCE HOLDING CLOSE
RELATIONSHIP NO LONGER NEEDED FOR
TIPPER-TIPPEE LIABILITY UNDER GIFT
THEORY-UNITED STATES V. MARTOMA,

894 F3D 64 (2D CIR. 2017).
Insider trading is extremely difficult to monitor and control as most
illegal conversations occur in private settings. Insider trading occurs when
a "tipper," a person who, because of their access to confidential information,
holds material non-public information and gives that information to a
"tippee," a person who then makes a trade in the stock market based on iteffectively giving that tippee an unfair advantage over all other investors.2
Many courts have attempted to reconcile and articulate a clear standard of
what type of relationship a "tipper" and "tippee" must have and what benefits
the parties must gain in order to be liable for insider trading.' In United
States v. Martoma,4 the Second Circuit struggled to apply the standards
developed in its previous cases regarding whether a person must have a close
personal relationship to another in order to be liable for insider trading.'
Ultimately, the Second Circuit held, in an amended decision, that a
"meaningfully close personal relationship" is not required to be liable for
insider trading under "gift theory."6
1 See Reem Heakal, Defining Illegal Insider Trading, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.
investopedia.com/articles/03/100803.asp [https://perma.cc/SMF6-KAX5] (last updated Aug. 22,
2017) (explaining what insider trading entails).
2 See id. (defining parties and their roles in insider trading). "The tipper is the person who has
broken his or her fiduciary duty when he or she has consciously revealed inside information. The
tippee is the person who knowingly uses such information to make a trade (in turn also breaking
his or her confidentiality)." Id. In most situations, both parties exchange this information for a
mutual monetary benefit. Id.
3 See id. (explaining how insider trading occurs and who parties are).
4 869 F.3d 58 (2d Cir. 2017).
5 See id. at 66-67 (discussing application of previously adopted standard).
6 See id. (providing Second Circuit's ultimate decision on "personal benefit" theory).
[A]n insider or tipper personally benefits from a disclosure of inside information
whenever the information was disclosed "with the expectation that [the recipient] would
trade on it," and the disclosure "resemble[s] trading by the insider followed by a gift of
the profits to the recipient," whether or not there was a "meaningfully close personal
relationship" between the tipper and tippee.
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Mathew Martoma ("Martoma") was a portfolio manager at the
hedge fund S.A.C. Capital Advisors, LLC ("SAC"), where he had buying
power of about $500 million in healthcare and pharmaceutical companies
and also advised other portfolio managers. In 2008, Martoma's main focus
was on "bapineuzumab," a new drug being developed in clinical trials to find
a cure for Alzheimer' s disease.8 Martoma hired expert networking firms and
arranged paid consultations with doctors on the bapineuzumab clinical-trial
monitoring committee to decide whether to invest in this new drug being
clinically tried jointly by two pharmaceutical companies, Elan Corporation
("Elan") and Wyeth. 9 Both doctors Martoma arranged consultations with,
Dr. Sidney Gilman and Dr. Joel Ross, were obligated to keep the clinical trial
results confidential; however, they breached that obligation by sharing the
material, non-public results with Martoma. 10
On June 17, 2008, knowing the drug had not yet proven effective
among the general population of Alzheimer's patients, Elan and Wyeth
falsely gave hope to Alzheimer patients with certain genetic characteristics
when they released the preliminary results of the bapineuzumab clinical
trial." In mid-July of 2008, Dr. Gilman was selected to present the final

results at the International Conference on Alzheimer's Disease. 2 A day after
learning the final results of Elan and Wyeth's trial, Dr. Gilman called

Martoma for about an hour and a half, which resulted in Martoma purchasing

Id. at 70 (internal citations omitted); see sources cited infra note 38 (discussing definition and
applicability of "gift theory").
7 See Martoma, 869 F.3d at 61 (discussing Martoma's responsibilities at SAC). Martoma
recommended investments to the owner and manager of SAC, Steven Cohen. Id.
8 See id. at 61-62 (explaining effects of bapineuzumab in clinical trials).
9 See id. (describing how Martoma obtained information about bapineuzumab clinical trial).
1o See id. at 62 (describing information released by both doctors during meetings with
Martoma). As the chair of the safety monitoring committee, Dr. Gilman not only had an obligation
to keep the results of the clinical trial confidential, but his consulting contract also reiterated this
obligation. Id. Dr. Gilman, however, had roughly forty-three consultations with Martoma "at a
rate of about $1,000 per hour," where he gave Martoma clinical trial updates and the dates of
upcoming safety meetings, so that Martoma could schedule their meetings. Id. Martoma also
arranged consultations with Dr. Ross, one of the main investigators of the clinical trials, who
charged $1,500 per hour. Id. Similar to Dr. Gilman, even though Dr. Ross also had an obligation
to keep information regarding the clinical trial confidential, nevertheless, he revealed this
information, which included his patients' confidential responses to the trial. Id.
1 See id. (describing Elan and Wyeth's press release statement).
12 See id. at 62 (discussing results of clinical trial). The press release also stated that the
specific and detailed results would be further explained at the July 29, 2008 International
Conference on Alzheimer's Disease. Id. Following the press release, Elan's share price increased.
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a flight to see Dr. Gilman to further discuss the developments in person. 3
After meeting with Dr. Gilman to view a PowerPoint presentation depicting
the results, which "identified two major weaknesses in the data that called
into question the efficacy of the drug as compared to the placebo," Martoma
contacted the owner of SAC to explain these new findings. 4 The next day,
SAC reduced its position by entering into short-sale and option trades in Elan
and Wyeth securities. 1 On July 29, 2008, when Dr. Gilman presented the
results at the International Conference on Alzheimer's Disease, Elan and
Wyeth's share prices "declined by about 42% and 12% respectively"
throughout the presentation and at the closing of trading the next day,
resulting in "$80.3 million in gains and $194.6 million in averted losses for
SAC .

16

On September 9, 2014, after a four-week jury trial in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York, Martoma was
found guilty of one count of conspiracy to commit securities fraud and two
counts of securities fraud in connection with an insider trading scheme. 7

13 See United States v. Martoma, 869 F.3d 58, 62 (2d Cir. 2017) (explaining Martoma's
reaction to phone call).
14 See id. (detailing Martoma's next steps within his company after discovering results).
15 See United States v. Martoma, 869 F.3d 62-63 (2d Cir. 2017) (discussing trades Martoma
entered into shortly after receiving news); see also Slav Fedorov, Definition of Position in Stock
Trading, POCKET SENSE, https://pocketsense.com/definition-position-stock-trading-7283802.html
[https://perma.cc/HQB8-7SJ2] (last updated July 27, 2017) (defining phrase reducing position as
"selling a certain number of shares to take partial profits, to reduce exposure to a particular stock
if it is not acting according to the trader's expectations, or as a precaution if market conditions
deteriorate."); James Chen, Short Selling, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/
terms/s/shortselling.asp [https://perma.cc/UJ59-RRBY] (last updated Feb. 4, 2020) (explaining
short selling).

In short selling, a position is opened by borrowing shares of a stock or other asset that
the investor believes will decrease in value by a set future date-the expiration date. The
investor then sells these borrowed shares to buyers willing to pay the market price.
Before the borrowed shares must be returned, the trader is betting that the price will
continue to decline and they can purchase them at a lower cost.
Id.; Lucas Downey, Essential Options Trading Guide, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.
com/options-basics-tutorial-4583012 [https://perma.cc/8C8E-H39X] (last updated Mar. 16, 2020)
("Options are contracts that give the bearer the right, but not the obligation, to either buy or sell an
amount of some underlying asset at a pre-determined price at or before the contract expires.").
16 See Martoma, 869 F.3d at 62 (acknowledging Martoma received $9 million dollar bonus
from his trading activity).
'" See 18 U.S.C § 371 (2019) (naming statute relating to conspiracy to commit securities
fraud); 15 U.S.C § 78j(b) (2019) (naming statute of securities fraud in connection with insider
trading scheme); Martoma, 869 F.3d at 61 (describing procedural history and severity of offenses).
Conspiracy to commit securities fraud arises:
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Shortly after Martoma's conviction, the Second Circuit issued a decision in
United States v. Newman, which held that the "personal benefit" a tipper
derives from giving the tippee the illegal information cannot be inferred
under a gift theory "in the absence of proof of a meaningfully close
relationship that generates an exchange that is objective, consequential, and
represents at least a potential gain of a pecuniary or similarly valuable
nature."' 8 Basing his complaint on the Newman holding, Martoma appealed
the first decision, initially arguing that the jury had not been properly
9
instructed because there was insufficient evidence to convict him.
However, while Martoma's appeal was pending, the Supreme Court issued
a decision in Salman v. United States," affirming the Ninth Circuit's
rejection of crucial parts of the Newman holding. 21 In light of the Supreme
Court expressly rejecting part of the Newman holding in Salman, the Second
Circuit held a supplemental briefing during Martoma's appeal in which
Martoma argued that Salman only rejected parts of the Newman decision;
2
thus, making the Second Circuit's holding erroneous .2 However, the
Second Circuit once again affirmed the judgment, finding that although
Salman abrogated Newman and made the lower court's jury instructions

[ilf two or more persons conspire either to commit any offense against the United States,
or to defraud the United States, or any agency thereof in any manner or for any purpose,
and one or more of such persons do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
§ 371. Martoma was also charged with two counts of security fraud in violation of 15 U.S.C §
78j(b), which states that a person is liable when they "use or employ, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security registered on a national securities exchange . .. deceptive device
or contrivance in contravention of such ... regulations as the Commission may prescribe as
necessary ... for the protection of investors." § 78j(b). Additionally, Martoma was charged with
violating 15 U.S.C. § 78ff, which defines the penalties for defendants. Martoma, 869 F.3d at 61.
18 See Martoma, 869 F.3d at 64 (quoting United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438,452 (2d Cir.
2014)) (explaining difference in interpretation between Martoma and Newman).
19 See id. at 64-65 (discussing Martoma's argument on appeal).
20 See 137 S. Ct. 420, 422 (2016) (affirming Ninth Circuit's rejection of Newman's
requirement of "pecuniary or similarly valuable nature").
21 See Martoma, 869 F.3d at 65 (discussing reasons why Supreme Court rejected Newman as
being inconsistent with Dirks v. S.E.C., 463 U.S. 646 (1983)). The Martoma court discussed what
the extent the Second Circuit held that the tipper
the Supreme Court had decided, which was, "[t]o
must also receive something of 'pecuniary or similarly valuable nature' in exchange for a gift to
family or friends ... this requirement is inconsistent with Dirks." Id. (citations omitted) (quoting
Salman v. United States, 137 S.Ct. 420,428 (2016)).
22 See United States v. Martoma, 894 F.3d 64, 68 (2d Cir. 2017) (discussing Martoma's
argument on appeal that Newman was not overruled by Supreme Court).
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erroneous, the instructional error did not affect Martoma's substantial rights
as would be required in order to re-try the case .21
In the United States, the rules that govern insider trading law are
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule lOb-5 of the
Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") rules.2 4 Both rules "prohibit
undisclosed trading on inside corporate information by individuals who are
under a duty of trust and confidence, which prohibits them from secretly
using such information for their personal advantage. 25 Tippees, individuals
who receive a tip from corporate insiders, can also be liable for insider
trading, not for the material nonpublic information they receive, but rather
because the information was disclosed to them "improperly. '26 Common
See id. (explaining why jury instructions were erroneous when analyzing "personal benefit"
based on Salman).
24 See 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j(b) (1934) (naming federal statute regarding insider trading);
Securities Exchange Commission, General Rules and Regulations, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2019)
(naming SEC regulation regarding insider trading).
25 See Salman, 137 S. Ct. at 423 (summarizing relevant rules of insider trading law).
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934's Section 10(b) provides:
23

[t]o use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on
a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, or any securities-based
swap agreement any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention
of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or
appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
§ 78j(b). The Securities Exchange Commission also has its own regulations similar to the federal
statute which states:
[i]t shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national
securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security.
§ 240.10b-5.
26 See Salman, 137 S. Ct. at 428 (holding defendant liable for insider trading because
information was "improperly disclosed."); Dirks v. S.E.C., 463 U.S. 646, 660 (1983) (discussing
when tippee liability arises); see also SEC v. Maio, 51 F.3d 623, 632 (7th Cir. 1995) (opining "a
tippee has a derivative duty not to trade on material non-public information when the disclosure of
information is improperand the tippee knows or should know that this is the case."); United States
v. Libera, 989 F.2d 596, 600 (1993) ("[Mlisappropriation theory requires the establishment of two
elements: (i) a breach by the tipper of a duty owed to the owner of the nonpublic information; and
(ii) the tippee's knowledge that the tipper had breached the duty."); United States v. Chestman, 947
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law imposes an "affirmative duty of disclosure" on corporate insiders, such
as controlling stockholders, directors, and officers in regard to securities .27
The expansion of insider trading law has long undergone development
because there is a need for more restrictions banning insider trading;
however, courts are reluctant to impose such hefty burdens that have an
"inhibiting influence on the role of market analysts," which is deemed
28
necessary to preserve a healthy market. Therefore, the Supreme Court and
SEC have consistently found that there is no "general duty between all
participants in market transactions to forgo actions based on material,
nonpublic information," however, those that do have a duty and breach it,
29
will be liable for insider trading. In Dirks v. S.E.C.,° a landmark decision
in securities law, the Supreme Court provided a test to determine the liability
F.2d 551,570 (1991) (holding tippee liability arises when tipper breaches fiduciary duty and tippee
knows of this breach).
27 See In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 911-12 (1961) (explaining who affirmative
duty applies to in insider trading law); see also United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642,652 (1997)
(quoting Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 228-29 (1980)) (explaining that relationships
between corporate insiders and corporations "gives rise to a duty to disclose [or abstain from
trading] because of the 'necessity of preventing a corporate insider from ... tak[ing] unfair
advantage of... uninformed stockholders."'); Dirks, 463 U.S. at 653 (walking through Cady
analysis and referring to it as "seminal case" in insider trading law); Jonathan Richman, Supreme
Court Reaffirms Personal-BenefitRequirementfor Insider Trading, PROSKAUER (Dec. 6, 2016)
https://www .proskauer.com/alert/supreme-court-reaffirms-personal-benefit-requirement-forinsider-trading [https://perma.cc/2Y6Z-AY2W] (discussing future problems that may arise because
of "what [Supreme Court] did not do").
21 See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 658 (discussing public policy reasons for having duties). "The need
for a ban on some tippee trading is clear." Id. at 659; but see Brief for Defendant-Appellant at 9,
United States v. Martoma, 894 F.3d 64 (2d Cir. 2017) (No. 13-4807), 2014 Lexis 601 (opining
to
subjective test "would be an enormous shift of power to prosecutors to bring insider trading
in
freedom
and
livelihood
their
to
risk
great
at
participants
market
put
prosecutions, which will
circumstances that the Supreme Court in Dirks expressly precluded.").
29 See Chiarella,445 U.S. at 233 (holding that not all material information is considered to be
breach of fiduciary duty); see also Maio, 51 F.3d at 631 (discussing alternative theories for
breaching fiduciary duty).
Currently there are two theories under which a breach of fiduciary duty can be
established such that a violation of Rule lOb-5 arises: (1) classical theory, and (2)
misappropriation theory. "Under the classical theory, a person violates [Rule lOb-5]
when he or she buys or sells securities on the basis of material, non-public information
and at the same time is an insider of the corporation whose securities are traded." Under
misappropriation theory a person violates Rule lOb-5 by "misappropriating and trading
upon material information entrusted to him by virtue of a fiduciary relationship .... "
Id. (citations omitted) (quoting SEC v. Cherif, 933 F.2d 403, 408-10 (7th Cir. 1991)); see also
O'Hagan,521 U.S. at 656 (holding misappropriation element is met because "fiduciary's fraud is
consummated, not when he obtains the confidential information, but when, without disclosure to
his principal, he uses the information in purchasing or selling securities.").
30 463 U.S. 646 (1983).

2020] SECOND CIRCUIT CHANGES TIPPING JURISPRUDENCE 353
of tippees, which most courts have followed since the case was decided in
1983. 31 Once a corporate insider breaches their fiduciary duty and discloses
material nonpublic information, a tippee automatically assumes "a fiduciary
duty to the shareholders of a corporation not to trade on material nonpublic
information," but only when the tippee knew or should have known that there
had been a breach.32
The first step in the Dirks analysis is to determine whether the
corporate insider's "'tip' constituted a breach of the insider's fiduciary
duty ."'3 To determine whether the disclosure constituted a breach of the
corporate insider's fiduciary duty, the court must determine the purpose of
the disclosure. 34 To establish the purpose of an insider's disclosure, Dirks
developed the "personal benefit test," which asks "whether the insider
personally will benefit, directly or indirectly, from his disclosure."35 The
31 See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 653-55 (discussing development of insider trading law and
developing test for tippee liability); see also Salman, 137 S. Ct. at 427 (quoting and applying
"personal benefit" test developed in Dirks); United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438,446 (2d Cir.
2014) (discussing tippee liability and how Supreme Court has interpreted personal benefit in recent
cases); Maio, 51 F.3d at 632 (holding that defendant in case was liable "under Dirks" test); Brief
for Defendant-Appellant at 17, United States v. Martoma, 894 F.3d 64 (2d Cir. 2017) (No. 134807) (stating that "[t]he requirement that a tipper must act for personal benefit before insider
trading liability can exist was first articulated by the Supreme Court in Dirks ....).
32 See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 660-62 (providing framework to determine when insider has
breached their fiduciary duty). "[Tippee] responsibility must be related back to insider
responsibility by a necessary finding that the tippee knew the information was given to him in
breach of duty by a person having a special relationship to the issuer not to disclose the
information..." Id. at 661 (quoting In re Investors Management Co., 44 S.E.C. 633, 651 (1971)).
33 See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 660-61 (discussing and providing test for tipper and tippee liability);
Adam Barone, What are Some Examples of Fiduciary Duty?, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.
investopedia.com/ask/answers/042915/what-are-some-examples-fiduciary-duty.asp [https://perma
.cc/XQ33-7BSL] (last updated Sep. 11, 2019) (explaining fiduciary duty as "the relationship
between two parties that obligates one to act solely in the interest of the other.").
14 See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 662 (discussing when corporate insider violates their affirmative
duty
of disclosure); see also O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652 (explaining when person commits fraud under §
10(b) and Rule 1Ob-5).

[A] person commits fraud "in connection with" a securities transaction, and thereby
violates § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5, when he misappropriates confidential information for
securities trading purposes, in breach of a duty owed to the source of the information...
a fiduciary's undisclosed, self-serving use of a principal's information to purchase or sell
securities, in breach of a duty of loyalty and confidentiality, defrauds the principal of the
exclusive use of that information.
Id.; Newman, 773 F.3d at 446 (quoting SEC v. Obus, 693 F.3d 276,284-85 (2d Cir. 2012) ("[S]uch
conduct [breaching duty of disclosure] violates Section 10(b) because the misappropriator engages
in deception by pretending 'loyalty to the principal while secretly converting the principal's
information for personal gain."').
35 See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 662 (stating test for "personal benefit," adding "absent a breach
by
the insider, there is no derivative breach."); see also Salman, 137 S. Ct. at 423 (In Dirks, "this Court
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"personal benefit" test requires courts to focus on objective criteria in
determining whether the corporate insider derived a direct or indirect
personal benefit, such as a "pecuniary gain or a reputational benefit that will
translate into future earnings. "36 A corporate insider's "personal benefit" can
be inferred "from objective facts and circumstances," such as "a relationship
between the insider and the recipient that suggest a quid pro quo from the
'3 7 Additionally,
latter, or an intention to benefit the particular recipient.
Dirks developed a "gift theory" stating that a "personal benefit" can be
inferred "when an insider makes a gift of confidential information to a
by the
trading relative or friend" because the "tip trade resembles trading
38
recipient."
the
to
profits
the
of
gift
a
by
insider himself followed
Although the Dirks test has been interpreted broadly throughout
most circuits, the Second Circuit in United States v. Newman attempted to
confine a gift of a personal benefit only to those tippers and tippees that have
'39
Additionally, the Second
a "meaningfully close personal relationship.
explained that a tippee's liability for trading on inside information hinges on whether the tipper
breached a fiduciary duty by disclosing the information."); Maio, 51 F.3d at 632 (applying Dirks
by reasoning if no breach by corporate insider, then no breach by tippee). 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
36 See Dirks v. S.E.C, 463 U.S. 646,663-64 (1983) (discussing elements of "personal benefit"
test); see also Salman, 137 S. Ct. at 421 (discussing examples provided in Dirks of when personal
benefits exist).
37 See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 664 (emphasis in original) (providing examples of personal benefits
that can be inferred from objective facts and circumstances); see also United States v. Jiau, 734
F.3d 147, 153 (2d Cir. 2013) (applying definition of "personal benefit" established in Dirks); SEC
v. Obus, 693 F.3d 276,285 (2d Cir. 2012) (opining personal benefit "includes not only 'pecuniary
gain,' such as a cut of the take or a gratuity from the tippee, but also a 'reputational benefit' or the
benefit one would obtain from simply 'mak[ing] a gift of confidential information to a trading
relative or friend."' (citing Dirks, 463 U.S. at 663-64)); see also Salman, 137 S. Ct. at 427 (quoting
"personal benefit" test developed in Dirks and affirming examples of personal benefits).
38 See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 664 (discussing additional inferences that may qualify as personal
benefit under gift theory); see also Salman, 137 S. Ct. at 427-28 ("Dirks specifies that when a
tipper gives inside information to a 'trading relative or friend,' the jury can infer that the tipper
meant to provide the equivalent of a cash gift."); Obus, 693 F.3d at 292 (finding personal benefit
existed because tipper "hoped to curry favor with his boss."). "In light of the broad definition of
personal benefit set forth in Dirks, this bar is not a high one." Obus, 693 F.3d at 292; see Jiau, 734
F.3d at 153 (indicating meals at restaurants, "iPhone[s], live lobsters, .... gift card[s], and a jar of
honey" can be considered personal benefits).
39 See United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438,452 (2d Cir. 2014) (explaining when personal
benefit may be found).
To the extent Dirks suggests that a personal benefit may be inferred from a personal
relationship between the tipper and tippee, where the tippee's trades "resemble trading
by the insider himself followed by a gift of the profits to the recipient," . .. we hold that
such an inference is impermissible in the absence of proof of a meaningfully close
personal relationship that generates an exchange that is objective, consequential, and
represents at least a potential gain of a pecuniary or similarly valuable nature.
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Circuit also held that the tipper must receive something that is "'pecuniary
or similarly valuable in nature' in exchange for a gift to family or friends."4°
However, when the Supreme Court had the opportunity to examine
Newman's narrow interpretation of a "meaningfully close personal
relationship" to confer a gift of a personal benefit, the Court only rejected
the part of the holding concerning Newman's "pecuniary value" of gifts.41
The Supreme Court's partial rejection of Newman's holding, leaving the
Second Circuit's "meaningfully close personal relationship" untouched, has
consequently caused turbulence with insider trading law .42
Id.; see also Laura Palk, Ignorance is Bliss: Should Lack of PersonalBenefit Knowledge Immunize
Insider Trading?, 13 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 101, 148 (2016) (suggesting Congress should intervene
based on controversial ruling of Newman); William K.S. Wang, Application of the FederalMail
and Wire Fraud Statutes to Criminal Liability For Stock Market Insider Trading and Tipping, 70
U. MIAMI L. REV. 220,290 (2015) ("If the reason for the 'personal benefit' requirement is to avoid
inappropriate liability for the 'tipper' in patient/psychiatrist, attorney/client, and even the
whistleblower/journalist, and similar scenarios, the Newman definition of Rule lOb-5 'personal
benefit' would be overly narrow."); Colby Hamilton, Rakoff Denies Insider Trading Indictment
Dismissal, Reprising Circuit Critic Role, N.Y. L. J., (Dec. 6, 2018, 5:06 PM), available at
https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/20l 8/12/06/rakoff-denies-insider-trading-indictmentdismissal-reprising-circuit-critic-role/?slreturn=20190225133919
[https://perma.cc/6ZA6-56GA]
(describing Newman decision as causing "judicial entanglements" with established precedent).
40 See Salman, 137 S. Ct. at 428 (discussing Second Circuit's incorrect interpretation of Dirks);
Newman, 773 F.3d at 452 ("[W]e hold that such an inference is impermissible in the absence of
proof of a meaningfully close personal relationship that generates an exchange that is objective,
consequential, and represents at least a potential gain of a pecuniary or similarly valuable nature.").
41 See Salman, 137 S. Ct. at 428 ("To the extent the Second Circuit held that the tipper must
also receive something of a 'pecuniary or similarly valuable nature' in exchange for a gift to family
or friends, we agree with the Ninth Circuit that this requirement is inconsistent with Dirks.") (citing
Newman, 773 F.3d at 452); see also The Supreme Court 2016 Term: Leading Case: Federal
Statutes and Regulations: Securities Exchange Act of 1934-Insider Trading- Tippee LiabilitySalman v. United States, 131 HARv. L. REV. 383, 386-88 (2017) (discussing why Salman Court
rejected Newman and evolution of insider trading law); Kendall R. Pauley, Comment, Why Salman
Is A Game Changer For the PoliticalIntelligence Industry, 67 AM. U.L. REV. 603,625-26 (2017)
(explaining how Salman impacted insider trading law and establishing factors to consider when
answering question of "what is a close friend?"); Second CircuitAgain Holds That Tipper/Tippee
Liability Can Arise from a Gift of Inside Information Even Without a Close Relationship,
PROSKATER (June 28, 2018), https://www.proskauer.com/alert/second-circuit-again-holds-thattipper-tippee-liability-can-arise-from-a-gift-of-inside-information-even-without-a-close-persnalrelationship [https://penna.cc/ZLQ9-JJBT] (explaining Salman's impact).
42 See Jonathan Macey, Martoma and Newman: Valid Corporate Purpose and the Personal
Benefit Test, 71 SMU L. REV. 869,877 (2018) (discussing changes in insider trading law based on
Newman and other recent decisions); see also Peter Henning, What Happened to "Meaningfully
Close Personal Relationship" in Insider Trading?, CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (Aug. 22, 2018),
http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2018/08/22/what-happened-to-meaningfully-close-personalrelationship-in-insider-trading/ [https://perma.cc/Y9BH-HXQG] ("The Supreme Court rather
unceremoniously gutted the second part of Newman's requirement in Salman v. United States.");
Martin Klotz et. al., "Meaningfully Close Personal Relationship" Test Survives, But Perhaps in
Name Only: Second Circuit Waters Down Newman's Test, WILLKIE FARR & GALLAGHER LLP
(June 26, 2018), https://www.willkie.com/~/media/Files/Publications/2018/06/MeaningfullyClose
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In United States v. Martoma, the main issue on appeal was whether
Newman's "meaningfully close personal relationship" test was still good law
and thus, could be applied to Martoma--the tippee--in finding him liable
for insider trading. 43 The Second Circuit faced a challenging decision in
addressing this issue, as the Supreme Court had abrogated one part of the
Newman holding, while simultaneously maintaining the "meaningfully close
personal" relationship requirement.' In the first Martoma decision, the
Second Circuit stated that the Salman holding completely abrogated
Newman's two holdings .45 Rather than analyzing whether "Newman's gloss

PersonalRelationshipTestSurvivesButPerhapsinNameOnly%2SecndCircuitatersDwnNewm
ansTest.pdf [https://perma.cc/QCK6-Q2J6] (discussing impact of Newman decision on insider
trading liability framework); The Supreme Court 2016 Term: Leading Case: Federal Statutes and
Regulations: Securities Exchange Act of 1934-Insider Trading-Tippee Liability-Salman v.
United States, supra note 41, at 392.
Insider trading doctrine, then, remains murky. The personal benefit test will continue to
sit awkwardly within the Court's dual fiduciary duties framework, while both market
participants and the SEC will continue to operate under an uncertain liability standard.
The Court's reluctance to tackle these doctrinal issues directly may, however, produce
an unintended benefit: If the incoherence of the doctrine leads to increasingly untenable
prosecutions - or, as the SEC would surely suggest, increasingly untenable
nonprosecutions - pressure may well mount on Congress to intervene and finally provide
a proper definition for the offense of insider trading.
Id. (emphasis in original); see also Michael Mayhew, New Ruling Makes It Easierfor Feds to Win
Insider Trading Cases, INTEGRITY RES. ASSOC. (Aug. 28, 2017), http://www.integrity[https://perma.cc/658Hresearch.com/new-ruling-makes-easier-feds-win-insider-trading-cases/
B5QB] ("[I]t will now be left up to a jury to decide whether someone providing material nonpublic
information who receives no specific benefit is providing an illegal 'gift' or not."); Jonathan
Richman, Second Circuit Holds That Tipper/Tippee Liability Can Arise from a Gift of Inside
Information Even Without a Close Personal Relationship, PROSKAUER (Aug. 23, 2017),
https://www.corporatedefensedisputes.com/2017/08/second-circuit-holds-that-tippertippeeliability-can-arise-from-a-gift-of-inside-information-even-without-a-close-persona-reationship/
[https://perma.cc/9ZQG-6RBV] (arguing Newman's decision rejected "meaningfully close
personal relationship" test as requirement "in order for a gift to constitute a personal benefit to the
tipper.").
43 See United States v. Martoma, 894 F.3d 64,76-77 (2d Cir. 2017) (discussing "meaningfully
close personal relationship" as only issue on appeal).
44 See Martoma, 869 F.3d at 68-69 (explaining how Supreme Court did not expressly overrule
both Newman holdings).
45 See id. at 69 (explaining Second Circuit's initial conclusion of Martoma). The Second
Circuit stated:
[w]hile the Supreme Court did not have occasion to expressly overrule Newman's
requirement that the tipper have a "meaningfully close personal relationship" with a
tippee to justify the inference that a tipper received a personal benefit from his gift of
inside information-because that aspect of Newman was not at issue in Salman-"[e]ven
if the effect of a Supreme Court decision it 'subtle,' it may nonetheless alter the relevant
analysis fundamentally enough to require overruling prior 'inconsistent' precedent." We
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on the gift theory [was] inconsistent with Salman," the Second Circuit
decided not to, reasoning that there were many other ways to establish Dirks'
"personal benefit" requirement. 46
After a supplemental hearing, the Second Circuit avoided
interpreting "meaningfully close relationship" and held that Martoma was
liable under the personal benefit "quid pro quo" gift theory because Martoma
paid $1,000 an hour for consultations and subsequently acquired material
47
nonpublic information, that he knew he was not supposed to have.
Additionally, the Second Circuit found that even if a jury could not find
Martoma liable under a "quid pro quo" gift theory, Martoma could still be
liable, as a rational jury could find that Dr. Gilman personally benefited by
providing the tip to Martoma to intentionally benefit Martoma's trading
activity in the pharmaceutical industry .48 Because a rational jury could find
Martoma guilty under either of those two theories, the Second Circuit held
that, although Martoma's jury instructions were erroneous, the error did not
affect Martoma's substantial rights. 9
The Second Circuit's decision in United States v. Martoma has
created great controversy, as some argue that the decision completely
dismissed Newman's "meaningfully close personal relationship," making it
easier for prosecutors to prove their case.5 0 Based on this unsettling decision,
respectfully conclude that Salman fundamentally altered the analysis underlying
Newman's "meaningfully close personal relationship" requirement such that the
"meaningful close personal relationship" requirement is no longer good law.
Id. (internal citations omitted); but see Martoma, 869 F.3d at 75 (Pooler, J., dissenting) (discussing
negative impact Martoma will have on insider trading law).
Today's opinion goes far beyond that limitation, which was set by the Supreme Court
in Dirks... received elaboration in this Court's opinion in Newman ...and was left
undisturbed by the Supreme Court in Salman .... In rejecting those precedents, the
majority opinion significantly diminishes the limiting power of the personal benefit rule,
and radically alters insider-trading law for the worse.
Martoma, 869 F.3d at 75 (Pooler, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted).
46

See Martoma, 894 F.3d at 71 (declining to analyze prosecution's argument that Newman

was fully abrogated in light of Salman).
47 See id. at 78 (explaining Martoma's liability under "quid pro quo" gift theory). The court
explained that Martoma's argument that Dr. Gilman did not bill him for the last two sessions,
suggested that they did not have a "quid pro quo" relationship. Id.
48 See id. at 79 (discussing Martoma's liability under "intention to benefit" theory).
49 See id. at 78 (finding Martoma's substantial rights were not affected as other methods were
available to find liability).
50 See Mayhew, supra note 42 ("It will now be left up to a jury to decide whether someone
providing material nonpublic information who receives no specific benefit is providing an illegal
'gift' or not. In our minds, this is leaving the door open for the government to bring a slew of
confusing insider trading cases."); see also Klotz, supra note 42 at 6 (expressing process in which
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a tipper could personally benefit from gifting a tippee material nonpublic
information, if it was intended to benefit the tippee, without even having a
"meaningfully close personal relationship," as long as the tipper thought the
tippee would trade on it.5 I The holding is problematic because it immensely
expands the Dirks holding that the Supreme Court intended to keep broad,
although not overly broad that it leads to endless litigation."5
In the Second Circuit's first decision, Judge Pooler argued in her
dissent that Martoma's holding allowed an "insider [to] receive[] a personal
benefit when the insider gives inside information as a 'gift' to any person,"
which was not what the majority held in Newman or what the Supreme Court
held in Salman.53 She further argued that the Dirks test provided a personal
test in order to limit who could "gift" inside information.5 4 By broadening
the standard to any person, the Second Circuit rejected the limiting power of
"personal benefit" that the Supreme Court intended to keep ."
As Judge Pooler argued, the fact that the Supreme Court purposely
left Newman's "meaningful close personal relationship" intact, and
mentioned "trading relative or friend," is a strong indicator that the Supreme
Court did not mean for it to apply to any person. 6 Possibly afraid to be

liability can arise is problematic). The only thing the process requires is "merely ... showing that
the tipper intended to benefit the tippee". Klotz, supra note 42 at 6.
51 See Pauley, supra note 41, at 607 (arguing Martoma is inconsistent with Salman decision);
see also Macey, supra note, 42 at 878 (describing Martoma as "easy case" that could have been
resolved without broadening Dirks test); Second CircuitAgain Holds That Tipper/Tippee Liability
Can Arise from a Gift of Inside Information Even Without a Close Relationship, supra note 41
(arguing that "[t]he latest decision again means that insider-trading liability can be established in
the Second Circuit 'by evidence that the tipper's disclosure of inside information was intended to
benefit the tippee,' regardless of the nature of the tipper's and tippee's personal relationship.").
52 See United States v. Martoma, 869 F.3d 58, 75 (2d Cir. 2017) (Pooler, J., dissenting) (stating
"result [of Martoma] will be liability in many cases where it could previously not lie."); see also
Henning, supra note 42 (opining after Martoma decision that "merely giving a tip to a complete
stranger may actually violate Rule lOb-5."); Macey, supra note 42 (explaining that Martoma
incorrectly applied Supreme Court precedent and Newman was close to solving ambiguity).
53 See Martoma, 869 F.3d at 75 (Pooler, J., dissenting) (discussing how Martoma decision
completely broadened "personal benefit" requirement Supreme Court established); see also Macey,
supra note 42 at 879 (opining that Second Circuit lacked analysis when reviewing Martoma);
Securities Exchange Act of 1934-Insider Trading-Tippee Liability--Salman v. United States,
supra note 41 at 392 (opining insider trading law still remains unsettled).
54 See Martoma, 869 F.3d at 75 (Pooler, J., dissenting) (discussing reasons Personal Benefit
Test exists and why Supreme Court has left it untouched).
55 See id. at 75 (Pooler, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original ) ("In holding that someone who
gives a gift always receives a personal benefit from doing so, the majority strips the long-standing
personal benefit rule of its limiting power .... Juries, and, more dangerously, prosecutors, can now
seize on this vagueness and subjectivity.").
56 See Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420, 429 (2016) (analyzing gift theory while
avoiding Newman's narrow interpretation). In Salman's six-page opinion, the Supreme Court
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overruled again, the Second Circuit in Martoma took precautions by
rejecting their "meaningfully close personal relationship" requirement, and
then amending in their second decision. 7 In their second decision, the
Second Circuit majority stated that there were other ways to establish
Martoma's liability, and there was no need to analyze whether the gift theory
was inconsistent with Salman.5
The majority in Martoma argued that
although anyone can gift inside information, it is limited only to a personal
benefit to the tipper if they had the intent to benefit and the tipper expected
the tippee to trade on it.5 9 Despite the Second Circuit's efforts to avoid
interpreting Newman, their ruling incorrectly applied Salman and has
increased the exposure of strangers being liable because anyone can "intend
to benefit" someone else and expect them to trade on the tip .60
Consequently, two strangers can now be liable for insider trading as
long as the tippee traded on the material non-public information, the tipper
intended to benefit the tippee, and the tipper expected the tippee to trade on
the information. Due to the legal community's unsettling concern, it is likely
the Supreme Court will soon officially opine over whether a tipper and tippee
must have a "meaningfully close personal relationship," be a "trading
relative or friend," or if a specific relationship simply does not matter. Until
then, lower courts will struggle to find a balance between the Supreme
Court's decision in Salman and the Second Circuit's amended decision in
Martoma.
Stephanie M. Calderon

repeatedly limited the gift of inside information to a tippee, who was a "trading relative or friend."
Id.
57 See Martoma, 869 F.3d at 69 (stating Newman decision is no longer good law); see also
United States v. Martoma, 894 F.3d 73-74 (2d Cir. 2017) (discussing Supreme Court's "personal
benefit" analysis).
58 See Martoma, 894 F.3d at 71 (discussing rehearing issues and why Newman gift theory may
not be analyzed).
" See id. at 78-79 (holding multiple ways to prevent everyone from being subject to liability
under Martoma).
60 See Second CircuitAgain Holds That Tipper/Tippee Liability Can Arisefrom a Gift ofInside
Information Even Without a Close PersonalRelationship, supra note 41 (emphasis in original)
(opining that Martoma court was trying to "avoid the risk of en banc reconsideration"); see also
Klotz, supra note 42, at 2 (discussing impact of Second Circuit's decision). The Second Circuit
"watered down the [meaningful close personal relationship] requirement so significantly that it can
no longer be deemed a meaningful hurdle to prosecution." Klotz, supra note 42, at 2.

